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A BATTLE BETWEEN LAW AND SOCIETY 
IN MICRONESIA: AN EXAMPLE OF ORIGINALISM 
GONE AWRY 
Brian Z. Tamanaha† 
Abstract: Two conceptions of the relationship between law and society appear to 
compete:  the idea that law mirrors society and the notion that a gap exists between law 
and society.  Both ideas have some truth—law is an imperfect mirror of society.  For 
various reasons, law and society can fall out of sync or even come into conflict.  The 
1975 Constitutional Convention, which led to the formation of the Federated States of 
Micronesia (“FSM”), marked the beginning of a battle between that society and its legal 
institutions.  The Constitution’s framers strove to preserve traditional Micronesian culture 
by ensuring it a respected place alongside modern legal doctrine.  Competing influences, 
however, conflicted with traditional norms.  Despite the reluctance of the framers, the 
laws of the United States supplied the language for key provisions of the Constitution, 
and U.S. legal precedents strongly influenced judicial interpretations of the Micronesian 
Bill of Rights and other constitutional provisions.  This put the legal system in tension 
with Micronesian norms, and the ensuing battle between law and society continues to this 
day.  Yet law need not battle society, even when the social and legal systems, with 
inconsistent norms and competing systems of power, are poised to clash.  Whether or not 
they battle depends largely upon the attitudes toward each system taken by the actors 
involved. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Two often-repeated notions run through law and society research:  
one, that law is a mirror of society, and two, that a gap exists between law 
and society.  The first notion, in its extreme form, suggests that the 
relationship between law and society is so intimate that it is incorrect to 
interject the conjunction “and” between these terms—law is always 
integrated within and produced by society, and society courses through every 
aspect of law, such that they cannot be separated.  The second notion, in its 
extreme form, suggests that law operates within but is autonomous from 
society—a self-defining and self-constituting complex of socially 
constructed legal practices, institutions, knowledge, and systems of 
communication and language. 
Although many law and society scholars accept both propositions as 
virtual truisms, an evident tension, if not outright contradiction, exists 
                                                      
†
 William Gardiner Hammond Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law.  Former 
legal counsel for the Micronesian Constitutional Convention of 1990; former Assistant Attorney General 
for the State of Yap, Federated States of Micronesia.  A version of this article will be published later this 
year by Cambridge University Press in The Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions, Mila 
Versteeg and Denis Galligan, eds., Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2012. 
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between them, for they stake out antipodal positions on the law-society 
relationship.  Contradiction is avoided by eschewing the extreme form of 
each.  The middle ground—adopted by most scholars—relies upon a 
positivistic understanding to identify law as the law-related activities of legal 
professionals and legal officials (picked out from society in this specific 
sense), while also acknowledging that law is always infused with and subject 
to social influences and factors.  Under this common understanding, law is 
separable from society, contrary to the extreme mirror position, while law is 
also continuously subject to pervasive social influences, contrary to the 
extreme autonomy pole. 
Even with this moderate view, however, the tension remains.  How 
can it simultaneously be held that law is a mirror of society and that a gap 
exists between law and society?  The short answer is that law is an imperfect 
mirror of society.  Law can be mismatched with, or be out of sync with, 
society in various ways for various reasons.  Mismatch occurs when law lags 
behind rapid social change or when law fails in an effort to produce social 
change.  Mismatch occurs when law from one society is imposed upon or 
transplanted to another society.  Mismatch occurs when society is comprised 
of different normative groups and the law reflects a selected group but not 
others.  In these and other situations, when law is manifestly not a reflection 
of society, the gaps typically are seen as aberrations or defects, as temporary, 
as a failure or flaw, as a deviant legal condition that will or must be 
rectified—in the long run at least. 
This way of thinking about the well-known “gap problem,” as it is 
called in the socio-legal literature, is a product of the notion that law is a 
mirror of society:  the perception of a gap is dependent on the expectation of 
a mirror.  That is, it is precisely the background belief that law reflects 
society that supplies the implicit assumptions that allow a mismatch or 
inconsistency between law and society to be seen as (merely) a “gap.” 
In this article, I will explore an instance of law engaging in a pitched 
battle with society.  This is a fascinating story worth telling in its own right, 
which will reveal interesting insights about law and society.  Talks of 
“mirrors” and “gaps” are metaphors which constrain how we perceive the 
interaction between law and society.  Sometimes these metaphors are 
entirely inapt. 
The battle I refer to emerged at the 1975 Micronesian Constitutional 
Convention and continues to this day. 
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II. THE BATTLE LINES AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
The convention was held under the auspices of the United States, 
through its administration of Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands, a United 
Nations mandate created at the close of World War II to help territories 
previously under Japanese colonial rule achieve independence.  Micronesia 
consists of hundreds of small islands across a vast expanse of the tropical 
equatorial region in the Western Pacific Ocean, stretching nearly 2,000 miles 
from the Philippines toward Hawaii.  Beginning in the late-nineteenth 
century, much of the region was successively ruled by foreign powers:  
Spain, Germany, Japan, and the United States.  The convention was 
Micronesians’ long awaited exercise of collective self-rule; it was the first 
concrete act on the road to political independence. 
Delegates from several discrete island groupings within Micronesia 
(each with their own languages and cultures)—the Marianas, the Marshalls, 
Palau, Yap, Chuuk, Pohnpei, and Kosrae—were brought together in Saipan 
to draft a constitution that would then be submitted to the electorate for a 
vote.  The convention was scheduled for ninety days in session with a break 
in the middle to allow delegates to return home for rest and feedback from 
constituents.  The delegates were supported by a convention administrative 
staff:  fourteen interpreters to assist those with limited English (the language 
of the convention), and a twenty-six-person Research and Drafting Section 
which prepared committee reports, drafted constitutional provisions, and 
was responsible for much of the written product of the convention.1 
The bulk of the discussion at the convention focused on basic political 
and institutional design choices:  number of national legislators from each 
state and the voting system; bicameral or unicameral house; parliamentary or 
presidential system; single or plural executive and method of selection; 
respective powers of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches 
(including allocation of jurisdiction between state and federal courts); 
respective powers of state and national governments; taxing power; division 
of revenue (mainly U.S. aid money) among the federal government and the 
several states; citizenship and suffrage rights; and method of constitutional 
amendment.  A separate contentious political conflict at the convention 
revolved around the insistence of the Palau delegation on a set of non-
negotiable demands, including placement of the national capital in Palau 
(Palau and the Marshalls later chose not to join the Federated States of 
Micronesia, preferring self-standing independence).  Issues surrounding land 
                                                      
1
  NORMAN MELLER, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN MICRONESIA (1985).  This excellent firsthand account 
of the convention supplied the background information in this section. 
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ownership were also prominent, including an intense debate (and several 
votes) over the government’s power to seize property through eminent 
domain; this was a contentious issue because Micronesian cultural systems 
are directly tied to the land and because the Trust Territory Administration 
had taken land under circumstances the Micronesians considered unfair.2  
Another very important political debate revolved around what role—if 
any—traditional leaders would have in the national government.  This was a 
crucial and delicate debate because traditional leaders were (and remain) 
influential in Micronesian societies, and a lack of support from traditional 
leaders, it was feared, might lead voters to reject the constitution.  
The battle between law and society that I refer to did not involve any 
of these political and institutional design issues.  Rather, the battle emerged 
in connection with two intersecting issues:  the impact on custom and 
tradition of the proposed bill of rights (and the constitution generally), and 
how judges would interpret the constitution and laws.   
A. The Explicit Protection of Custom and Tradition 
The desire to preserve custom and tradition was a widely shared 
concern which had special salience in connection with civil rights and with 
judging.  While the delegates supported civil rights, they worried that these 
rights might operate to the detriment of custom and tradition.  Micronesians 
have a hierarchical, communitarian-oriented society, not a Western 
individualist society, which several provisions of the Bill of Rights reflect.  
To alleviate this concern, an early draft of the Bill of Rights was amended to 
specifically include a provision “which will be equal in rank with the other 
Bill of Rights to protect and preserve our Micronesian customs, traditional 
laws and morality.”3  In support of this provision, a delegate explained that it 
would speed the work of the convention “if there [were] a provision in there, 
[because] it [would] eliminate unnecessary and lengthy debate concerning 
the relationship of custom and traditions to every civil right’s [sic] measure 
that would come[] up for consideration on the floor of the Convention.”4 
An early draft of this protective measure stated: 
                                                      
2
  See, e.g., Chief Bossy, Convention Del., Remarks on Eminent Domain (Aug. 16, 1975), in 1 
JOURNAL OF THE MICRONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1975, at 136 (1976) (“Many of my 
people have had the misfortune of owning beautiful parcels of land which the Trust Territory Government 
wanted, and the government took, through the exercise of . . . eminent domain.”). 
3
  Jacob Sawaichi, Convention Del., Remarks on Special Committee Report No. 2 (Aug. 16, 1975), 
in 1 JOURNAL OF THE MICRONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1975, at 134-35 (1976). 
4
  Id. at 135. 
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Protection of Micronesian Tradition.  The traditions of the 
Micronesian people may be protected by legislation and 
administrative action taken pursuant thereto.  If challenged as 
violative of any of the provisions of this [Bill of Rights], the 
essentiality of the Micronesian tradition protected may be 
considered as a compelling social purpose warranting such 
governmental action.5 
Notwithstanding the apparent thrust of this proposal to accord protection to 
custom, a delegate opposed it on the astute grounds that it appeared to grant 
courts the authority to hear challenges against custom, and the language 
(“may be considered . . . compelling”) implied the power to rule against 
custom: 
I feel this amendment clearly indicates, to me, that every time 
an alleged violation of our traditions and customs is taken to the 
court, the court’s ruling is final and that ruling prevails.  This 
means to me, further, Mr. President, that should a court in 
Micronesia rule against tradition and custom, one by one, our 
tradition and custom will undergo a very, very slow death.  
These customs and traditions which we are supposedly 
attempting to protect will slowly disappear from the face of 
Micronesia.6 
To eliminate this concern, the final enacted version changed “may” into 
“shall,” as follows:  “[i]f challenged as violative of [the Bill of Rights], 
protection of Micronesian tradition shall be considered a compelling social 
purpose warranting such governmental action.”7  
B. The Judicial Guidance Clause 
The second front in the battle was a pointed effort to restrict courts to 
Micronesian sources of law—to finally end the dominance of U.S. law in 
Micronesia after decades under Trust Territory courts employing American 
judges who applied U.S. law.  As one delegate remarked, “I wish to point out 
that in the past the Trust Territory Courts have copied to a great extent 
                                                      
5
  Comm. Proposal No. 4, Providing for the Preservation of Local Customs, in 1 JOURNAL OF THE 
MICRONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1975, at 148-49 (1976). 
6
  Leo A. Falcam, Convention Del., Remarks on Committee Proposal No. 22 (Oct. 25, 1975), in 1 
JOURNAL OF THE MICRONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1975, at 149 (1976).  
7
  FSM CONST. art. V, § 2.  In earlier drafts, this provision was included within the Bill of Rights, 
but it was later taken out and combined with the provision on the powers of traditional leaders to create a 
separate article specifically dealing with traditional rights. 
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English common law which I sometimes think is not relevant here in 
Micronesia.”8  A delegate proposed two separate provisions to achieve this  
effect.  The first proposal stated: 
The interpretation of this constitution shall not be made in the 
light of any other constitution known in Micronesia, 
immediately before the effective date of the constitution.9 
The intention behind this provision, as attributed to its proponent, was 
“that . . . the Micronesian courts [not] interpret the Micronesian Constitution 
in the same way as interpreted by the courts of another jurisdiction whose 
constitution contained identical or similar language.”10 
As will be revealed in the course of this article, this observation is of 
crucial significance in the battle between law and society.  It evidences clear 
awareness on the part of the delegates that the language of constitutional 
provisions borrowed from the U.S. Constitution is likely to be interpreted 
relying upon U.S. court decisions, and it manifests a strong desire to reject 
this practice of interpretation.   
A second provision was proposed as well: 
Commencing with the effective date of this constitution, all 
common law, foreign to Micronesia, shall cease to exist.  All 
legal interpretations shall henceforth be drawn from this 
Constitution.11   
The explained intention behind this proposal, in part, was a desire “to build 
up a body of Micronesian common law, through court decisions based on 
Micronesian customs and traditions and the total social and physical 
configuration of Micronesian life.”12 
There is no mistaking the sentiment behind these two proposals, 
which evince a heartfelt determination to halt the dominance of U.S. law in 
Micronesia.  The Research and Drafting Section softened these proposals out 
of worry that that they would hamstring courts by prohibiting them from 
drawing upon anything not stated in the Constitution or statutes.  They were 
rephrased from mandatory prohibitions to instead allow courts the freedom 
to consider other sources of interpretation and other bodies of law, while still 
                                                      
8
  Hans Wiliander, Convention Del., Remarks on Special Committee Report No. 2 (Aug. 16, 1975), 
in 1 JOURNAL OF THE MICRONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1975, at 420 (1976). 
9 
 Misc. Commc’n No. 23, in 1 JOURNAL OF THE MICRONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 
1975, at 349, 351 (1976) (Letter from Norman Meller, Dir. of Research & Drafting, to Hon. Tosiwo 
Nakayama, Micronesian Const. Convention President (Oct. 13, 1975)). 
10
  Id. 
11
  Id. 
12 
 Id. at 352. 
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emphasizing that appropriateness for Micronesian circumstances remained 
paramount. 
The version that made it to the floor merged the two foregoing 
proposals into one: 
Judicial Guidance.  Decisions of Micronesian Courts shall be 
consistent with this Constitution, Micronesian customs and 
traditions, and the social and geographical configuration of 
Micronesia.  Decisions of the Trust Territory Courts, and the 
common law of other nations, are not binding precedents.13 
However, an amendment was proposed to delete the second sentence 
on the grounds that it was problematic and unnecessary.  It was potentially 
problematic in the view of some delegates because a significant body of law 
had been built up in the preceding decades as well as by foreign courts 
which could be a useful source of law for Micronesian courts to consider 
(albeit not as binding precedent).  The main opposition was that the second 
sentence was unnecessary.  As one delegate put it, “the new courts are not 
going to be bound as a practical consequence of having adopted the new 
Constitution by the previous decisions of courts.  We need not say that.  To 
say it means that we are overly worried about something we should not be 
concerned about.”14  He added that explicitly stating that they are not bound 
by the decisions of other courts—given that it is self-evidently true—“only 
shows our sense of insecurity.”15  Over a delegate’s objection that the second 
sentence serves as a useful reminder, the convention voted to enact only the 
first sentence, which became the “Judicial Guidance Clause,” Section 11 of 
Article XI on the Judiciary. 
C. The Impenetrability of Technical Legal Language 
The third battle line was drawn around the fact that important 
constitutional provisions had obscure legal meanings and implications.  This 
was not a problem with respect to the political and institutional design issues 
mentioned earlier, all of which were fully debated and crafted in accordance 
with the directions of the delegates.  Yet several crucial provisions, including 
the entire Bill of Rights, were drafted by the legal staff, borrowing language 
                                                      
13
  Committee Proposal No. 22, Proposal Relating To Judicial Guidance, in 1 JOURNAL OF THE 
MICRONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1975, at 419 (1976). 
14
  Johnson Toribiong, Convention Del., Remarks on Committee Proposal No. 22 (Oct. 25, 1975), in 
1 JOURNAL OF THE MICRONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1975, at 420 (1976). 
15
  Id. at 421. 
302 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 21 NO. 2 
 
from the U.S. Constitution and court decisions.  The accompanying 
committee reports explained these provisions in a highly technical manner. 
This issue came to a head when, on the sixty-fifth day of the 
convention, a group of traditional leaders requested a one-week 
postponement on consideration of the Bill of Rights to allow them the time 
to absorb the dense, legalistic twenty-page committee report that explained 
the provisions.  The delegate requesting the delay noted a general problem 
with legal terminology at the convention: 
There are times that we may think and feel that we have 
understood important issues—and all of a sudden we find 
ourselves wondering why we voted yes or no on a particular 
matter.  I am very much concerned that the language we are 
using in this Convention is a second language to all of us and is 
not well understood by most of us, if not at all.  These are 
highly technical, highly abstract issues written in a language 
unfamiliar to most of us so I can sympathize with the efforts of 
the traditional chiefs in attempting to make sure that they fully 
appreciate and fully understand what they are adopting and 
making a part of the Constitution of our new government.16 
Two delegates separately objected that the committee report was filled 
with citations to U.S. cases and was extremely difficult to comprehend, and, 
furthermore, that the oral explanations provided by the legal staff who 
drafted the report did not help clear up matters. 
In response to these general complaints, the Director of Research and 
Drafting, Norman Meller, explained to the convention floor that problems of 
this sort are inevitable when legal language is borrowed: 
Language which is being used in the Constitution has meaning.  
The exact meaning will be determined by Micronesian courts 
after the Constitution goes into effect.  Meanwhile, to assist the 
Delegates to understand both its possible scope and limitations, 
reference has been made to the practices of other countries. . . .  
With regard to the Declaration of Rights portion of the 
Constitution, U.S. cases have been used as examples of 
interpretation.  This is because the United States was a pioneer 
in the inclusion of a Bill of Rights in a national constitution and 
it is common for other countries to look to American 
                                                      
16
 Leo A. Falcam, Convention Del., Remarks on Proposed Delay (Oct. 10, 1975), in 1 JOURNAL OF 
THE MICRONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1975, at 311 (1976). 
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experience.  I hasten to add that this is not the same thing as 
saying the courts in those countries are, or in Micronesia, will 
be, bound by those American decisions. . . .  If desired, staff 
will eliminate all references to judicial decisions in materials 
we prepare.  Unfortunately, if called upon to answer questions 
on the possible legal meaning of phraseology, whether or not a 
case is referred to by name, the knowledge of how the courts 
have interpreted that language must be availed of by staff in 
responding, if their response is to be as accurate as they can 
make it.17 
To appreciate the magnitude of this problem and to comprehend the 
extent to which the delegates were mystified by the legal terminology, it is 
necessary to read an excerpt of the committee report that accompanied the 
proposed Bill of Rights.  While reading the excerpt, keep in mind that 
English was a second language for the delegates, most of whom had little or 
no legal training.  The proposed due process and equal protection clause 
read:  “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due 
process of law nor be denied equal protection of the laws.”18  The report 
follows this proposed constitutional language with ten explanatory 
paragraphs.  Here is one of the paragraphs:  
While procedural due process requires governmental 
decision-making to conform with the concept of what is fair 
and just, substantive due process, on the other hand, addresses 
the rationality of the legislature.  With substantive due process, 
the court basically looks at the rationale or legitimacy of the 
governmental interest.  In subjecting a statute to the 
requirements of substantive due process, the court asks:  (1) 
Does the government have power to regulate the subject 
matter?  If the statute is not within the power of the 
government, the statute will be struck down.  For example, 
inasmuch as public monies cannot be expended for other than 
public purposes, a fortiori, an exercise of the taxing power for 
merely private purposes is beyond the authority of the 
legislature.  Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 255 (1875); 
Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 300 U.S. 644 (1937).  
                                                      
17
 Misc. Commc’n No. 23, supra note 9, at 350. 
18
 Standing Comm. Rept. [SCREP] No. 23, in 2 JOURNAL OF THE MICRONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION OF 1975, at 793, 795 (1976) (Comm. on Civil Liberties, Comm. Proposal No. 14, Bill of 
Rights). 
304 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 21 NO. 2 
 
(2) If the government has the power to regulate, the court next 
asks if what the statute proposes to do bears a rational 
relationship to the implementation of the legislative goal.  
Another way of asking the same question is, “Can any 
reasonable legislature choose this particular statute to achieve 
its goal?”  In subjecting a statute to this second test, it must be 
pointed out that the statute is presumed to be valid.  The 
challengers of the statute must bear the burden of proving that 
the statute is devoid of any rational basis.  Additionally, with 
respect to economic measures, the courts do not substitute their 
social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative 
bodies.  Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877); Ferguson v. 
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730, 733 (1963).  (3) Finally, where the 
statute involved arguably infringes upon individuals’ 
fundamental rights, the court must ask how important is the 
legislative objective.  In other words, where fundamental rights 
are involved, the court resorts to balancing the legislative goals 
against the fundamental rights which would arguably be 
infringed if the statute were to stand.  The court must ask if 
there is a compelling governmental interest to justify holding 
the statute valid, even though the statute might limit 
fundamental rights.  The burden of proving compelling 
governmental interest shifts to the government.  The 
presumption is in favor of protecting fundamental rights, until 
the government proves a compelling justification to so curb 
these rights.  Such presumption also protects against irrational 
application of valid statutes.19 
One can admire the valiant effort of the legal staff to condense the 
complex constitutional doctrine of substantive due process into a single 
paragraph, while still recognizing that this passage, which assumes a great 
deal of background legal knowledge, would be impenetrable to most non-
lawyers who read it (all the worse for non-native English speakers).  To 
understand this passage one must know about, at minimum, the distinction 
between procedure and substance, the rational relation test, the balancing 
test, what burdens of proof and presumptions are, what fundamental rights 
are, and how to measure a compelling government interest.  Now imagine 
twenty pages of this sort of text, which comprised the committee report on 
                                                      
19
  Id. at 796. 
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the Bill of Rights, and the dilemma confronting the delegates becomes 
apparent. 
That is why the delegates protested.  They were fully aware, and 
deeply discomfited, that they were giving their imprimatur to constitutional 
words that would be interpreted and applied—words that would bind future 
law-makers and citizens—in ways they could not fully grasp.  The concern 
generated by this lack of comprehension was magnified by the fact that the 
committee report was filled with reference to U.S. cases, contrary to the 
expressed desire of the delegates to be freed of the dictates of U.S. law (as 
manifested in the aforementioned Judicial Guidance Clause).20  Nonetheless, 
in response to their complaints, the delegates were in effect told by the legal 
staff, “that is how law is.”  Legal terminology has the capacity to carry and 
convey its own meaning that can be impervious to penetration.   
What is remarkable is that the future Micronesia Supreme Court did 
precisely what the delegates feared and endeavored to prevent—it adopted a 
broad swath of U.S. law.  In a cruel twist of events, the very delegates who 
labored mightily to sever the subservience to U.S. law were later to become 
the authority that judges invoked when adopting U.S. law. 
To provide a foretaste of the next phase of the battle, which will be 
taken up in the following section, it is useful to note here that the paragraph 
quoted above was recited in an opinion by Supreme Court Chief Judge 
Edward C. King in a case deciding whether a governmental immunity bar to 
a medical malpractice suit infringed upon the Due Process Clause.  The 
details of the case are not relevant here.  What matters is how Judge King 
utilized the above passage.  Immediately after quoting the above passage 
from the committee report, he asserted,  
This explanation reveals that the framers anticipated that, 
depending on the nature of the rights involved, one of two 
different kinds of tests would be applied to determine whether a 
particular governmental regulation or statute which affects life, 
liberty or property is consistent with the constitutional demand 
for ‘due process of law.’”21 
Proceeding to apply the two tests (in the name of the framers), King 
continued in the same vein, asserting that “it appears quite likely that the 
framers anticipated that other rights, not specifically referred to in the 
                                                      
20 
 See supra Part II.B. 
21
  Samuel v. Prior, 5 FSM Intrm. 91, 101-02 (Pon. 1991) (emphasis added). 
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declaration of rights, would be protected as fundamental rights under the 
Due Process Clause.”22 
The legal staff that authored the report might have anticipated these 
things.  However, in light of the concerns expressed by the delegates about 
the impenetrability of the legal terminology—and their complaints about this 
committee report in particular—it seems well warranted to assert that the 
delegates anticipated nothing of the sort.  In a book recounting the 
convention, Norman Meller highlighted this reality: 
All Convention actions occurred within a constraining 
paradigm of language and law which most delegates could 
vaguely sense, but about which I was acutely aware and could 
do little.  Everything formally said and written was in English, 
the official language of the Convention, as was all personal 
intercommunication between delegates not hailing from the 
same district.  Interpreters labored to bridge the gap between 
the vernaculars of their principals and the complex English 
within which ideas frequently took shape, try as staff might to 
simplify the language employed.  But there was a problem 
beyond interpretation or minimizing the use of “legalism,” for 
all of the English terminology employed was technical in the 
sense that it depended upon a warp and woof of historical 
concept and legal experience with which few of the delegates 
were adequately conversant, regardless of their English-
speaking abilities. 
To give specificity to the words employed, and being 
trained in American law, the staff referred to American practice 
and judicial construction of meanings.  As a matter of course, 
they shaped delegate and committee proposals, as well as the 
supporting rationale contained in committee reports, within the 
general conceptual frame of a common law jurisprudence.23 
When discussing this problem, Meller—the head of Research and 
Drafting—writes as if the legal staff had no real option:  “What other course 
could the staff have followed in an area which for over three decades had 
been and was yet being administered under the usages of the English 
language as embodied in American legal practice?”24 
                                                      
22
  Id. at 102 (emphasis added). 
23
 MELLER, supra note 1, at 196. 
24
  Id. 
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The legal staff was indeed grappling with a difficult task.  Yet other 
options were available at hand, as Meller acknowledges, in existing 
constitutional models from other Pacific Island countries like Fiji and 
Western Samoa.25  Choices were made by the legal staff, choices shaped by 
assumptions taken from their American legal training.   
Moreover, while the legal staff assumed the posture of merely 
formalizing into legal language the desires of the delegates, they did much 
more than that.  In some instances they were active agents who shaped the 
substantive thrust of the constitutional provisions.  This is evident in 
Section 4 of the Bill of Rights:  “Equal Protection of the laws may not be 
denied or impaired on account of sex, race, ancestry, national origin, 
language, or social status.”26  This is far more expansive than the Equal 
Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  Meller justified the additional 
categories as reflective of “the additional meanings accreted elsewhere over 
time through court interpretation.”27  Setting aside the question of whether 
this was indeed an accurate restatement of U.S. equal protection law (rather 
than the legal staff’s ideal version of equal protection law), the crucial point 
is that this new language inserted by the legal staff carried within it 
potentially fundamental implications for Micronesian culture and society.  
To state just the two most obvious areas, Micronesian cultures have radically 
different gender roles and relations from those in the United States, and they 
are hierarchical societies (for example, Yap has a caste system).  The explicit 
inclusion of “sex” and “social status” potentially threatens these deep 
cultural values in uncertain and unknowable ways.  This is why, as Meller 
recognized, one of the most contentious issues was “basic conflict on the 
floor touching the quick of Convention emotions regarding the primacy of 
traditional rights over the civil liberties more recently introduced into 
Micronesia.”28 
Thus, the battle between law and society was joined.  The delegates 
appeared to prevail on behalf of society in this crucial engagement by 
including a provision that would explicitly protect custom and tradition 
when a clash arose with the Bill of Rights, and by including the Judicial 
Guidance Clause to require judges to develop a Micronesian body of law.  
Yet none of this would ensure that their wishes would be heeded, as the 
delegates seemed to sense, owing to the immanent potential of legal 
terminology to exert its own meanings.  
                                                      
25
 Id. at 197. 
26 
 Id.  
27 Id. at 245. 
28
  Id. at 198. 
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III. “THE FRAMERS” OF THE CONSTITUTION IN COURT  
The Constitution was ratified three years after the convention, in 1978 
(the intervening delay was caused by U.S. objections to certain provisions in 
the draft), and the new nation was called the Federated States of Micronesia 
(“FSM”).  Edward C. King and Richard Benson were appointed in 1980 as 
the first two judges on the national court—called the FSM Supreme Court—
by the first President, Tosiwo Nakayama. The Court began to function in 
May 1981.  It was divided into trial and appellate levels; as there were only 
two judges at the time, the judge who did not hear the case at trial would 
preside on appeals, along with two temporarily appointed judges sitting by 
designation to hear the case.  Benson and King were American expatriate 
lawyers, both of whom had spent time in the region prior to their 
appointment, Benson as a judge on nearby Guam for several years, King as 
an attorney for four years in the Micronesian Legal Services Corporation 
based in Saipan.  The judges whom King and Benson invited to sit by 
designation on appellate panels ranged from local state judges to American 
federal court judges.  Given this arrangement, it was inevitable that the 
approaches taken by Judges King and Benson would substantially shape the 
jurisprudence of the new nation. 
Judge King, in particular, embraced his mission to build a body of law 
for the country.  The focus herein will be limited to his decisions as they 
relate to the battle between law and society traced out in this article—his 
work at the intersection of custom and tradition, the Bill of Rights, 
subservience to U.S. case law, and the Judicial Guidance Clause. 
A notable aspect of Judge King’s analysis was his frequent and heavy 
reliance on “the framers” when justifying his decisions.  In his eleven years 
on the court, from 1981 to 1992, King referred to “framers” in thirty-six 
separate opinions.  This exceeds the combined total references to “the 
framers” (twenty-seven in all) in opinions written by all the other judges on 
the court from 1981 through 2007 (five judges have secured permanent 
appointments to the Supreme Court since its inception).  There is nothing 
untoward in referring to the framers.  One of the main tasks of the new court 
was to work out the implications of the new Constitution, and one way for 
judges to work this out was to consider the purposes of the people who 
prepared it.  However, two oddities stand out regarding Judge King’s 
analysis:  his references to “the framers” hardly resemble the delegates who 
were actually at the convention, and time and again his invocation of the 
framers served as a prelude to (and justification for) the adoption of 
American law. 
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One of King’s very first decisions, when sitting as a trial judge in a 
criminal prosecution, considered the issue of whether evidence seized by 
police without a search warrant can be used in the criminal case against a 
defendant.  The relevant constitutional provision reads:  “The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and other possessions 
against unreasonable search, seizure, or invasion of privacy may not be 
violated.”29  As King noted, this clause, which is modeled on the Fourth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, does not specify how to determine 
what makes a search “unreasonable,” nor what should happen to evidence 
obtained in constitutionally inappropriate searches.  “We must probe 
further,” King continued, “to determine the full meaning of the framers in 
employing this constitutional language.”30  King then pointed to the Journal 
of the Constitutional Convention: 
The Journal in this instance . . . provides unmistakable 
direction.  The Micronesian Constitutional Convention’s 
Committee on Civil Rights proposed the Declaration of Rights 
in substantially the form subsequently incorporated within the 
constitution. . . .  The proposed language and supplemental 
discussions in the Committee Report reveal that in developing 
the Declaration of Rights for the Constitution of the Federated 
States of Micronesia, the Committee, and subsequently the 
Convention itself, were drawing almost exclusively upon 
constitutional principles under United States law.31 
This would prove to be a fateful analytical move.  For the next step—which 
came after Judge King noted the substantial similarity between the wording 
of the U.S. Search and Seizure Clause and the FSM Search and Seizure 
Clause—followed almost inexorably from the first: 
Thus, the Journal of the Micronesian Constitutional 
Convention teaches that, in interpreting the Declaration of 
Rights in the Constitution of the Federated States of 
Micronesia, we should emphasize and carefully consider United 
States Supreme Court interpretations of comparable language 
in the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution.  We 
therefore turn to these decisions for aid in determining the 
meaning of the word “unreasonable” and in framing principles 
to be employed in upholding the protection against 
                                                      
29
  FSM CONST. art. IV, § 5. 
30
  FSM v. Tipen, 1 FSM Intrm. 79, 83 (Pon. 82) (emphasis added). 
31
  Id. at 83 (internal citation omitted) (citing Standing Comm. Rept. No. 23, supra note 18).  
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unreasonable search proclaimed in Article IV, Section 5 of the 
Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia.32 
Judge King then launched into an exegesis of U.S. constitutional search and 
seizure doctrine, extensively quoting from or citing sixteen U.S. Supreme 
Court cases.  He ended up adopting the U.S. reasonableness analysis for the 
FSM. 
In the bootstrapping style characteristic of common law legal analysis, 
this case, FSM v. Tipen, would later be cited (frequently by King himself) for 
the propositions that the similar language in the U.S. and Micronesian Bills 
of Rights suggest that U.S. case law should be considered.  King did not 
mention the Judicial Guidance Clause in his decision, the objections from 
delegates at the convention about the heavy reliance on U.S. case law in the 
committee report, or their complaints that they could not apprehend the legal 
explanations in the report.  
This was the beginning of a pattern Judge King would reiterate 
multiple times.  An early appellate opinion issued the same year, Alaphonso 
v. FSM, which considered what burden of proof is required in criminal cases, 
introduced a twist on this pattern involving the Judicial Guidance Clause.  At 
the outset of the opinion, King chastised the lawyers for their omission: 
The parties here have . . . merely cited legal authorities from the 
United States, including decisions of United States federal and 
state courts, without explaining why those authorities are 
pertinent to these issues before this Court. 
The Constitution instructs us that we may not merely 
assume away, or ignore, fundamental issues on the grounds that 
these basic issues have previously been decided in a particular 
way by other courts in other circumstances and under different 
governmental systems.  The “judicial guidance” provision, Art. 
XI, § 11 of the Constitution, tells us that our decisions must be 
“consistent” with the “Constitution, Micronesian customs and 
traditions, and the social and geographical configuration of 
Micronesia.”33 
King quoted two passages from the report attached to the Judicial 
Guidance Clause explaining the desire of the delegates to shape a body of 
law suitable to Micronesia, rather than blindly follow Trust Territory cases 
and U.S. law.  In later cases, Judge King would often cite Alaphonso for the 
                                                      
32
  Id. at 85 (emphasis added). 
33
  Alaphonso v. FSM, 1 FSM Intrm. 209, 212 (Pon. 1982). 
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proposition that the Court paid due regard for the unique circumstances of 
Micronesia. 
In the case itself, however, after his extended homage to the Judicial 
Guidance Clause, Judge King immediately veered in a different direction.  
He noted that the Due Process Clause in the FSM Constitution says nothing 
about the burden of proof in criminal cases; he noted the parallel language 
between the Due Process Clauses in the U.S. and FSM constitutions; and he 
noted that in the committee report attached to the Due Process Clause “the 
Committee relied principally upon decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court . . . .  The obvious lesson is that we are to look to the interpretative 
decisions of United States courts concerning the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”34  Thus, following his 
nod to the Judicial Guidance Clause, King arrived on familiar ground, citing 
ten U.S. cases, adopting the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for the 
FSM. 
In the course of his analysis, Judge King made a seemingly odd 
remark that he treated as highly significant: 
The framers of this Constitution, and subsequently the voters in 
ratifying could only have been aware of constitutional 
interpretations rendered prior to and at the times of the 
Constitutional Convention, and ratification of the Constitution 
through plebiscite.  We should therefore emphasize 
interpretations in effect at those times.35 
Judge King touted, and often later repeated, this cut-off date as an essential 
“protection” for Micronesians—“a timing limitation, which diminishes the 
import of decisions made by the U.S. Supreme Court after July 12, 1978, the 
date of the plebiscite.”36 
This remark is odd for several reasons.  King’s careful locution—they 
“could only have been aware” of a U.S. precedent in existence at the time 
they voted—is logically unassailable (of course they could not possibly 
know of anything that did not exist then).  However, the soundness of his 
assertion that pre-1978 precedents carry greater import depends upon the 
correctness of one or both of the following positive assertions:  that the 
delegates and voters were in fact aware of or that they did in fact intend that 
                                                      
34
  Id. at 215-16. 
35
  Id. at 215 (emphasis added). 
36
  Edward C. King, Custom and Constitutionalism in the Federated States of Micronesia, 3 ASIAN-
PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 249, 266 (2002). 
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greater weight be given to U.S. precedents then in existence.  Neither 
assertion is remotely true. 
It is a pure pretense to suggest that the delegates had any awareness of 
U.S. constitutional decisions at the time.  As described earlier, the delegates 
struggled to understand the legal explanations prepared by the legal staff for 
the Bill of Rights.37  None of the U.S. cases Judge King cited in Alaphonso 
(and in many other decisions King later wrote following this analysis) were 
actually mentioned in the committee report.  Judge King’s cut-off date is the 
mid-1978 ratification by voters, which is a abuse of fact and reason.  It 
borders on deception to imply that the voters had any knowledge of or 
intention about pre-vote cases.  The delegates at least had an opportunity to 
review the committee report (never mind understand it).  However, the 
people, the mass of Micronesians in villages and towns (many with limited 
English and education) who voted to ratify the Constitution had no exposure 
to it and had no idea what it contained.  Leading up to the vote, there were 
public meetings and general education programs about the proposed 
constitution, but there was no detailed legal analysis, which the people may 
not have been able to understand anyway. 
As for their actual intent, the delegates had repeated their fervent wish 
to halt the practice of blind obedience to U.S. precedent, although they 
permitted consideration of U.S. decisions for whatever insight they might 
offer to Micronesian judges. 38   Remember, on this point, that several 
delegates explicitly complained about the presence of citations to U.S. 
Supreme Court cases in the committee report attached to the Bill of Rights, 
which prompted the Director of Research and Drafting to offer to excise the 
U.S. cases (although he said it would be pointless).  The delegates, with their 
unmistakable intention, would have attached no significance to when the 
U.S. precedent was decided, whether before or after the convention, because 
under all circumstances, U.S. precedents were not to be binding—that is 
exactly what the delegates had said.  All U.S. precedents would have the 
same weight:  they were information for the Micronesian judge to consider. 
The crucial distinction Judge King drew between pre- and post-
ratification U.S. cases was meaningless with respect to what the delegates 
and voters actually knew, and it was contrary to what they actually intended.  
It was an elaborate gesture of self-abnegation on the part of Judge King (and 
other judges who have repeated it) to maintain the veneer that his decisions 
comported with the consent of the people as embodied in their drafting and 
adoption of the Constitution. (This was a “gesture” rather than a genuine 
                                                      
37  See supra Part II.C. 
38  See supra Part II.B. 
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limitation because, notwithstanding his assertion, Judge King regularly cited 
post-1978 U.S. cases anyway.) 39   He would point to the “protection” 
provided by the cut-off date as a significant mark of the genuine 
independence of the Micronesian court from obedience to U.S. law. 
Alaphonso became a template for future cases.  Judge King would 
begin with a nod to the Judicial Guidance Clause; then he would note the 
similarity in language between the U.S. and FSM constitutional language 
and mention that the committee reports cited U.S. cases; next, he would 
engage in extensive discussions of U.S. case law; finally, he would conclude 
by adopting U.S. legal approaches.  Following this mode of analysis, he 
adopted U.S. doctrines of judicial review,40 search and seizure,41 vagueness 
in criminal statutes, 42  abstention, 43  voluntariness in confessions, 44  and 
common law claims,45 among other legal doctrines.46  On occasion, King 
rejected prevailing U.S. law, but rarely on the grounds that it was unsuitable 
for Micronesian circumstances—he simply appeared to disagree.47  In this 
manner, he steadily built up a body of law that closely resembled U.S. 
common law and individual liberties analysis. 
At times, Judge King’s analysis of the framers was perfunctory and 
conclusive.  In a case in which the defendant argued that the police could not 
search an open field without a warrant, Judge King noted that since Hester v. 
United States, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1924, the law was clear 
that warrantless open field searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
The framers of the Federated States of Micronesia Constitution 
looked to United States court decisions to determine the 
meaning to the words they were selecting for the declaration of 
rights in this Constitution. 
                                                      
39
 See, e.g., United Church of Christ v. Hanno, 4 FSM Intrm. 95 (App. 1989); FSM v. Jonathan, 2 
FSM Intrm. 189 (Kos. 1986). 
40
 Suldan v. FSM, 1 FSM Intrm. 339 (Pon. 1983). 
41
  FSM v. George, 1 FSM Intrm. 449 (Kos. 1984). 
42
  Laion v. FSM, 1 FSM Intrm. 503 (App. 1984). 
43
  Panuelo v. Pohnpei, 2 FSM Intrm. 150 (Pon. 1986). 
44
 FSM v. Jonathan, 2 FSM Intrm. 189 (Kos. 1986). 
45
  Semes v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 2 FSM Intrm. 131 (Pon. 1985). 
46
 An excellent survey of the Court’s jurisprudence is provided in Dennis K. Yamase, THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA: THE FIRST TWENTY FIVE YEARS (2006), available at 
http://www.fsmlaw.org/fsm/rules/FSMSupCt25YrsforPDF.pdf. 
47
 See Federal Business Development Bank v. SS Thorfinn, 4 FSM Intrm. 367 (App. 1990) 
(declining to follow U.S. precedent that foreclosure on ship is not within maritime jurisdiction); Aisek v. 
Foreign Investment Board, 2 FSM Intrm. 95 (Pon. 1985) (adopting the concrete adversary requirement of 
standing doctrine, but rejecting the nexus requirement); see Samuel v. Prior, 5 FSM Intrm. 91 (Pon. 1991) 
(refusing to recognize medical malpractice claim, although other common law claims previously 
recognized). 
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The searches here fall within the Hester open fields 
doctrine.  There is no reason to doubt that the framers intended 
for that doctrine to apply here.48 
Contrary to King’s assertion, it is unequivocally clear that the 
delegates had no intention at all about the matter.  Needless to say, the 
Hester decision and the open fields doctrine were never mentioned at the 
convention—and the committee report (which King cites) on this particular 
provision of the Bill of Rights does not actually refer to any U.S. cases.49 
Most of the time, Judge King invoked the framers to draw a positive 
warrant for the incorporation of U.S. case law, but in a few instances he 
found no evidence of framers’ intent, which allowed him to avoid following 
U.S. precedents.  In a case involving whether the enforcement of a mortgage 
on a ship is within the Court’s admiralty jurisdiction, King was confronted 
with a 150-year-old U.S. Supreme Court precedent that mortgages fall 
outside admiralty jurisdiction.  Judge King cited several criticisms by U.S. 
legal scholars of this early decision, he emphasized the import of the Judicial 
Guidance Clause, and then he raised the framers:  
Of course, if the constitutional history of the Federated 
States of Micronesia revealed that the framers, or the 
electorate, in embracing the language of the United States 
Constitution, specifically intended to adopt the particular 
interpretation given those words by the United States courts, 
then we would not be free to seek an alternative meaning.  
However, the journals of the Micronesian Constitutional 
Convention reveal no such specific intent concerning the 
meaning of the words “admiralty or maritime.”50 
In light of his general approach, this is an astonishing passage.  In 
none of the cases discussed above in which King relied upon framers’ intent 
to adopt U.S. case analysis was there any evidence of specific intention to 
support his reliance.  In all of those cases—for example, whether the Due 
Process Clause requires the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard—the 
Constitution and Journal of the Constitutional Convention were silent, 
suggesting that no one had thought about the issue.  Indeed, the strongest 
evidence of intention that bears on the issue was the general desire of the 
                                                      
48
 FSM v. Rosario, 3 FSM Intrm. 387, 388-89 (Pon. 1988) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) 
(citing Standing Comm. Rept. No. 23, supra note 18, at 793). 
49  See Standing Comm. Rept. No. 23, supra note 18. 
50
  Federal Business Development Bank v. SS Thorfinn, 4 FSM Intrm. 367, 372 (App. 1990) 
(emphasis added). 
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delegates that the future court not slavishly follow U.S. precedent, a desire 
which Judge King largely frustrated. 
Another telling case raised the issue of the standing requirements 
plaintiffs must meet to bring suit.  Issues about standing to sue are not 
addressed in the Constitution and were not raised at the convention.  Per 
usual, Judge King began with a reference to the import of the Judicial 
Guidance Clause, then made this strongly stated assertion:  “Many 
provisions of this Constitution are derived from the United States 
Constitution and the framers surely intended that interpretation of the words 
adopted would be influenced by United States decisions in existence when 
this Constitution was adopted, in October 1975, and ratified on July 12, 
1978.”51  To the contrary, as argued above, they surely had no such intention.  
What makes this case revealing is that Judge King wanted to loosen the yoke 
of U.S. standing law—to adopt the “concrete adverseness” requirement of 
standing doctrine but not the “nexus” requirement.  To provide himself this 
freedom, King noted that standing law happened to be “a particularly 
unsettled area of United States law when the FSM Constitution was drafted 
and ratified.”52  Because it was unsettled, his reasoning went, the framers 
and voters would not have been certain about the law (in fact they knew 
nothing about it either way).  King then remarked that in 1978, the nexus 
requirement was limited to taxpayer suits.  “Thus ratification of the 
Constitution can not be seen as indicating an intention by the framers or the 
people of the Federated States of Micronesia that this additional obstacle to 
court access be adopted.”53 
Judge King was indisputably correct that the framers and people had 
no intention to adopt the nexus requirement, but they just as surely had no 
intention to adopt any of the many doctrines taken from U.S. cases that 
Judge King positively declared in their name and by their authority.  His 
analysis of the framers erects an elaborate set of fictions, for the delegates 
and voters had no knowledge about any of this, and gave nary a thought to it.  
The flesh and blood delegates at the convention were transformed in King’s 
legal analysis into abstract entities who must have intended certain things—
no matter how remote from their actual intentions—by virtue of the 
language they adopted and the committee reports they (purportedly) read 
and understood. 
A process of abstraction is often utilized in law to re-describe social 
situations and events to conform to and serve legal categories and modes of 
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  Aisek v. Foreign Investment Board, 2 FSM Intrm. 95, 98 (Pon. 1985). 
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  Id. at 99. 
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  Id. at 102. 
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analysis.  This is one of the ways law manages, constrains, and channels 
social influences, sometimes to tame them or stave them off.  This is not law 
acting on its own—Judge King skillfully wielded these modes of legal 
analysis to implant into Micronesian law legal doctrines he was familiar with 
and believed in.  When so doing, every time Judge King referred to “the 
framers,” he erased the actual identity of the Micronesian delegates and 
voters and used them to accomplish his own legal ends. 
Micronesian law did not have to be built this way, and Judge King did 
not have to proceed in this fashion.  While it makes sense that he would 
adopt legal tests he was familiar with, and it is entirely appropriate that he 
would look to U.S. cases for guidance when faced with novel issues, he 
could have systematically consulted a range of legal sources, especially the 
constitutions and laws of other Pacific Island countries.  He could have taken 
up each issue on its own terms, evaluating the pros and cons, the relevant 
policies and principles, as they bear on the government, the law, and the 
political, economic, geographical, and cultural conditions of Micronesia—
indeed, Judge King decided a number of cases in this more open and 
straightforward fashion.54  However, to a significant extent, especially early 
in his tenure, he relied heavily on U.S. cases and engaged in standard 
American-style legal reasoning.  His utilization of framers’ intent was 
disingenuous, thereby building into the jurisprudence of the new nation a 
strain of fictional legal analysis that survived his departure.   
When Judge King retired in 1993, he was replaced as Chief Justice by 
Andon Amaraich.  Amaraich had enjoyed a long career in a variety of high 
level government positions in Micronesia.  Although he did not have a law 
degree, he had worked as a public defender for ten years.  He was also a 
long-time Congressman under the Trust Territory and the FSM, and he 
headed the national department of external affairs under two presidents.55  
Directly relevant to this analysis, Amaraich served on the legal staff at the 
1975 constitutional convention, drafting a number of the constitutional 
provisions. 
From 1992 until the end of 2007, Judge Amaraich issued seven 
written opinions that referred to “the framers,” far fewer times than Judge 
King did.  His treatment of the framers stands in stark contrast to that of 
Judge King’s.  One striking difference is that Amaraich cited far fewer U.S. 
cases than King.  In four of the seven cases mentioning the framers, 
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  See, e.g., Semes v. Continental Air Lines Inc., 2 FSM Intrm. 200 (Pon. 1986). 
55
  See Press Release, Government of the Federated States of Micronesia, The Federated States of 
Micronesia Mourns the Loss of one of its Founding Fathers: Chief Justice Andon Amaraich (Jan. 28, 2010), 
available at http://www.fsmgov.org/press/pr012810.htm. 
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Amaraich cited zero U.S. cases; in a fifth and sixth case he cited one and 
three U.S. Supreme Court cases, respectively, 56  as informative on the 
issues—but without suggesting that the framers intended to endorse those 
precedents.  In only one case in which he mentioned the framers did Judge 
Amaraich engage in a significant discussion of U.S. cases; this was a case 
involving the taxing power.  Judge Amaraich considered U.S. tax doctrines 
(in a separate section labeled “United States Case Law”) on their merits for 
how they might inform his decision, choosing to adopt certain tests for his 
analysis, but at no point did he link these cases back to the framers’ intent.57  
Another striking difference is that when Amaraich discussed the framers’ 
intent, it was in relation to things the framers actually did debate and try to 
achieve, whereas Judge King’s references to the framers tended to be purely 
abstract discussions of what they must have intended when borrowing U.S. 
constitutional language.  Judge Amaraich also frankly acknowledged that 
legal questions arose which the framers simply had not foreseen, and he 
accepted responsibility for making the decision. 58   No abstract framers 
appear in the pages of Judge Amaraich’s opinions. 
IV. THE EXISTENTIAL BATTLE BETWEEN SOCIETY AND LAW  
While the struggle revolving around “the framers” was concealed in 
the dry legal analysis of judicial opinions, a remarkable clash between law 
and society erupted in plain view that exposed the depth of the conflict.  In 
separate incidents on Yap several months apart in 1988, Joseph Tammed and 
Raphael Tamangrow each committed sexual assault.59  Ten days after his 
attack, Tammed was taken by relatives of the victim to the victim’s father’s 
house and severely beaten, left with a bloodied face and a broken hand.  
Tamangrow was likewise seized, a week after his attack, by fellow villagers 
of the victim, and severely beaten to the point of unconsciousness; he was 
thereafter hospitalized for five days (adding to his offense was the fact that 
his victim was of a higher caste).  According to members of the community, 
both beatings were administered as customary punishment. 
Tammed and Tamangrow were later separately charged and convicted 
of sexual assault.  At their respective sentencing hearings, they asked the 
presiding judge, Richard Benson, to reduce their sentences in light of the 
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  See Pohnpei v. KSVI, 10 FSM Intrm. 53 (Pon. 2001); Pohnpei v. MV Hai Hsiang, 6 FSM Intrm. 
594 (Pon. 1994). 
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 See Chuuk v. Secretary of Finance, 8 FSM Intrm. 353 (Pon. 1998). 
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  See, e.g., FSM v. Kotobuki Maru No 23, 6 FSM Intrm. 65, 74 (Pon. 1993). 
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  The facts of these incidents are set forth in the consolidated case of Tammed v. FSM, 4 FSM 
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“customary beatings” they had suffered.  Judge Benson refused to consider 
the beatings, stating: 
The judgments of this court do have an effect on the community 
and in future cases a group of men taking the law into their own 
hands can say, “It’s all right.  The Court lets us handle the 
punishment.”  I make that statement not denying that there is 
apparently, because it’s been raised in two cases now, a Yapese 
custom along these lines.60   
Both defendants then appealed their respective sentences, arguing that Judge 
Benson erroneously failed to take their customary punishments into 
consideration to reduce their sentences. 
On Yap, custom and tradition have great importance in social and 
political life.  The Attorney General (“AG”) of Yap State, Cyprian Manmaw 
(now Chief Justice of the Yap State Court, who earned a law degree in the 
United States and served as AG for twenty years), followed a policy of 
deference to customary actions.  The Yap Attorney General’s office 
supported Tammed and Tamangrow on their appeal; Manmaw would not 
have brought the original assault charges against Tammed and Tamangrow 
had the crime been under state jurisdiction because he considered the 
customary punishment to resolve the matters. 
Judge King ruled in favor of the defendants on appeal, finding that 
Judge Benson should have considered the customary punishments in 
mitigation of their sentence (citing a similar case from Australia).  Yet Judge 
King spent the better part of the opinion sending a warning to Yap State that 
it would be held to account if it continued to defer to customary 
punishments.  Here is the critical (threatening) passage: 
There is an even greater need for caution in this case 
because of the apparent policies of Yap state officials 
concerning these kinds of customary punishments, as reflected 
in the record and explained further in oral argument. . . . 
For example, government counsel during Mr. Tammed’s 
sentencing hearing indicated to the trial court that if the office 
of the Yap attorney general makes a determination that a 
particular punishment has been carried out “in accordance with 
Yapese custom,” then that office “would not file the charges” if 
the underlying criminal offense was a violation of state rather 
than national law. 
                                                      
60
  Id. at 271. 
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This practice of course amounts to a substitution of the 
customary punishment in place of the judicial proceedings and 
punishment contemplated by the Constitution and state statutes.  
Under the policy of the Yap attorney general’s office, beating is 
no longer just a customary punishment, but also serves as the 
entire official state trial and punishment for that specific 
offense.  The traditional leaders who authorized the 
punishment, and the village members who carried it out, may 
well be transformed through this ratification into government 
agents or officials. . . . 
By embracing the customary punishment as fulfillment of 
their own prosecutorial and governmental responsibilities, 
governmental officials may effectively make themselves 
participants in the punishments meted out pursuant to custom.  
This policy of the office of the Yap attorney general runs the 
risk of so identifying the Yap state government with attacks 
upon individuals, which state officials could not carry out 
directly, as to transform those customary punishments into 
action of the state.61 
Through the legal-speak, Judge King was saying that if this policy 
was continued, Yap State could be subject to civil lawsuits for customary 
punishments, and those who administer the punishment could be subject to 
suit as well for civil rights violations (in addition to simple battery).  To 
make this message clear, King cited the statutory provision for civil rights 
claims.62 
Judge Benson and Judge King held the unshakable conviction that the 
state has a monopoly over law—and, in particular, a monopoly over the 
infliction of legitimate violence.  This is what Judge Benson was thinking 
when he feared that men would “take the law into their own hands.”63  This 
explains why Judge King could assert that the customary punishments might 
be “the entire official state trial and punishments” and those who carried out 
the punishments might be “government agents or officials.” 64   If one 
assumes that there is only one legitimate legal system, and that this system 
resides in the state, then it follows that any valid punishments are, by 
conceptual necessity, actions of the state no matter who carries them out. 
                                                      
61
  Id. at 282-83 (emphasis added). 
62
  Id. at 284 n.11.  In a later article discussing the case, King acknowledged the point of this 
reminder.  See King, supra note 36, at 278. 
63
  Tammed v. FSM, 4 FSM Intrm. 266, 271 (App. 1990). 
64
  Id. at 282. 
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The Yapese people saw the law differently.  They saw two legal 
systems existing side-by-side, with the state legal system mainly handling 
affairs of government and business.  With respect to social affairs (including 
property rights, family affairs, and altercations), they believed that 
customary ways of responding to problems had primacy.  That is why 
Manmaw deferred to customary actions that effectively resolved matters.  
Owing to this primacy, if it happened that police officers were among the 
relatives of the victims and hence participated in the customary beatings (as 
apparently occurred in Tammed’s punishment), they were acting as members 
of the community in their customary capacity—people who just happened to 
be police officers—not as police officers. 
This is an existential battle in the genuine sense that the judges found 
it unacceptable, a threat to the very idea of law, to be confronted with a 
competing legal system that people accorded primacy to over state law in 
certain affairs.  Judge King was not troubled by allowing the customary 
punishments to be considered in criminal sentencing because this meant they 
operated by leave of and within the parameters established by state law.  
Judge King’s overarching assumption that state law must have primacy was 
displayed, albeit implicitly, in an article he wrote ten years later, after his 
retirement from the bench: 
If traditional leaders do believe that continuation of 
customary punishments is desirable, traditional leaders and 
governmental officials should explore why this is so.  Is it 
because of a lack of confidence in the constitutional legal 
justice system?  Is this in turn based on a perception that 
communities are unsafe?  If so, those concerns should be 
discussed, and consideration should be given to the possibility 
of adjusting legislative authorizations, law enforcement actions, 
and court pretrial detention and sentencing practices to respond 
to these concerns. 
On the other hand, is it possible that traditional 
punishments are being used primarily as a way for the local 
community or traditional leadership to assert greater control and 
to demand greater respect?  Institutions typically seek self-
strengthening devices, and there is no reason why this should be 
different for traditional leadership.  If this is an important 
purpose of customary punishments, could that same benefit be 
obtained in some way that does not include physical violence or 
possible violation of constitutional standards?  Could traditional 
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leaders be involved more closely in the criminal justice 
process?  If traditional leaders believe they are sufficiently 
certain as to the identity of an offender to justify a customary 
punishment, would they be willing simply to turn over their 
information to government officials if they knew that prompt 
action would be taken?65 
His reflections on Tammed reveal that Judge King never really 
understood what was at stake.  He could not envision the beatings as 
anything other than brutal acts of violence.  Of course the traditional leaders 
were interested in maintaining their power within the customary system 
(much like judges within the state system), as King skeptically suggests, but 
events cannot be explained in those terms. 
Nor was the issue for the Yapese about improving the state legal 
system to better serve their needs as a community, as King’s questions 
assume.  Rather, at issue was nothing less than the continued existence of 
their own thriving legal system, a system they identified with because it was 
the product of community actions in accordance with norms they all 
understood.  Recall, if you will, the complaints of the delegates at the 
constitutional convention about the foreign (U.S.) feel and impenetrability of 
state law.  Their customary system raised no similar objections for the 
Yapese people precisely because it was their system. 
It is essential to recognize that Yapese society was (and remains) 
cohesive and well ordered in large part because its customary systems 
functioned fairly well.  Manmaw’s policy of deference to the customary 
system, which Judge King objected to, served to enhance the functioning of 
both legal systems in their own primary spheres, and helped negotiate their 
interaction when they intersected. 
A final incident will help demonstrate this point.66  When Manmaw 
resigned as Attorney General to become Chief Justice, his long-time 
assistant in the office, Victor Nabeyan, was appointed to replace him.  A few 
months after he took the AG position, Nabeyan, while drunk one day, 
committed an assault and battery.  This was especially embarrassing because 
the AG is the top legal official in the state.  Nabeyan was immediately 
placed on administrative leave by the Governor.  The Governor advised the 
Speaker of the Legislature that the incident involved family members, 
different villages, and possible criminal charges, writing: 
                                                      
65
  King, supra note 36, at 280-81. 
66
  This incident and subsequent events is described in B. Gorong, Victor Nabeyan Remains as 
Attorney General, YAP NETWORKER, July 20, 2007, at 4-5. 
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As the resolution of these concerns are a mixture of traditional 
and governmental responsibilities and functions—some more 
traditional than others, and vice-versa—the Lt. Governor and I, 
despite our strong desire to resolve the matter quickly, saw it fit 
to let those concerns we have limited authority over, and those 
beyond our authority (i.e., family feud, village disputes, and 
criminal investigation) be resolved first while waiting for input 
from other branches of the state government.67 
Nabeyan made a public apology for his conduct, sending the 
statement to the Traditional Councils of Pilung and Tamol (the main island 
chiefs, and the outer island chiefs, respectively), as well as to all state 
officials, and he tendered his resignation to the Governor.  Meanwhile, 
traditional means of reconciliation took place between the individuals and 
families to heal the rift.  The Council of Pilung then called for a special 
meeting with the Governor and Legislature to express its view that Nabeyan 
be allowed to remain as Attorney General to manage the state’s legal 
business.  “The Council’s belief was that the matter was a ‘non-issue’ for the 
State because a ‘weinig’ at the family and village levels had been tendered 
and accepted and ‘harmony between and among villages concerned has been 
restored.’”68   The prosecutor’s office (in Nabeyan’s absence) decided to 
defer prosecution for battery because the victim refused to press charges 
owing to the reconciliation.  The Council of Tamol sent a letter telling the 
Governor they supported his decision to reinstate Nabeyan “as long as there 
should be no conflict between our traditional custom and the State 
Government.”69  With these various positions arrived at, the Governor lifted 
the three-week leave of absence, and Nebayan served as AG thereafter. 
The handling of this incident is a brilliant example of the effective 
interweaving, within Yapese society, of traditional customs and processes 
with modern governmental processes, including state law, each with its own 
realm and ways, yet working in interaction to find workable resolutions.  
Judge King could not see the genuine importance of the customary system 
and how it worked.  King was happy to allow the state legal system to 
recognize customary apologies, but not customary punishment70—yet they 
were all of a piece, a total way of life, that could not be pried apart while 
maintaining its integrity. 
                                                      
67
  Id. at 5. 
68
  Id.  
69
  Id. 
70
  See King, supra note 36, at 268-69. 
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This final incident also reveals that, against the theme of this article, 
law need not battle society, even when the social and legal systems are 
poised to clash with inconsistent norms and competing systems of power.  
Whether or not they battle depends to a large extent upon the attitudes 
toward each system taken by the actors involved—especially the attitudes of 
state legal officials.  
V. THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN SOCIETY AND LAW GOING FORWARD 
In 1990, after a decade of independence, a second constitutional 
convention was held, this time without the United States lurking in the 
background.  Only three amendments were ultimately enacted, two of which 
were directed at the topics discussed above. 
One amendment added a new second sentence to the Judicial 
Guidance Clause, which now reads (the amendment indicated in italics): 
Court decisions shall be consistent with this Constitution, 
Micronesian customs and traditions, and the social and 
geographical configuration of Micronesia.  In rendering a 
decision, a court shall consult and apply sources of the 
Federated States of Micronesia.71 
This addition was an implicit rebuke of the Court’s jurisprudence, and of 
Judge King in particular.  The committee report proposing the amendment 
reads: 
A review of Supreme Court decisions since the advent of 
constitutional government in the Federated States of Micronesia 
shows a pattern of reliance on precedent from the United States.  
Your Committee is concerned that the Supreme Court may not 
be giving proper attention to section 11 of article XI of the 
Constitution.  Therefore, we support re-emphasizing our 
determination that courts shall first examine sources from the 
Federated States of Micronesia prior to relying upon precedent 
from other jurisdictions.  The word “source” is used broadly to 
include not only court decisions, constitutional history, and 
other legal writings from the Federated States of Micronesia, 
but also the customs and traditions of our nation.72 
                                                      
71
  FSM CONST. art. XI, § 11 (amended 1991) (emphasis added). 
72
  COMM. ON GOVT’L STRUCTURE & FUNCTION, FSM CONST. CONVENTION STANDING COMM. REP. 
NO. 27-90, at 2 (1990). 
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As this explanation indicates, the second sentence added nothing new; it 
merely emphasizes the point of the first sentence. 
A second successful amendment removed legislative power over 
“major crimes” from the national government and gave it to the states, 
leaving national power only over crimes of a “national” nature.73  The effect 
of this amendment was to divest national courts of jurisdiction over these 
criminal cases.  Under the previous system, the national government would 
handle all crimes subject to punishment for three or more years (later 
increased to five years, then ten years), including serious crimes like rape 
and murder.74  That is why the prosecutions of Tammed and Tamangrow for 
sexual assault were handled in the national court system.  Following the 
amendment, state prosecutors and courts have exclusive control over crimes 
of this sort. 
Taking stock of developments thus far, a few conclusions can be 
drawn with some confidence.  Judges King and Benson have departed, and 
Judge Amaraich recently died.  There are currently two sitting national 
judges, Judge Martin Yinug, a Yapese with an American law degree, and 
Judge Dennis Yamase, an expatriate American lawyer who has lived and 
worked in Micronesia for decades.  As would be expected after three 
decades of independence, a substantial body of law has developed.  Judicial 
opinions today are filled with citations to Micronesian cases.  Although U.S. 
cases are cited far less frequently than in the past, behind many of the 
Micronesian cases lie U.S. precedents, and many of the legal rules and 
doctrines are derived from the United States. 
In this respect, Judge King was extremely effective, and his enduring 
legacy will not likely be erased.  Common law systems tend not to 
reexamine precedents.  Nor is it necessarily desirable that the developed 
body of rules should be reexamined in a wholesale manner.  Legal officials 
in Micronesia have become accustomed to their jurisprudence and the 
system operates well.  Many of the technical legal doctrines the court 
adopted, for example rules like abstention and standing, have no 
implications for Micronesian traditional culture, but are essential to every 
judicial system and must be worked out.  The critical tone of this article 
should not diminish the genuine achievement of the first generation of 
judges on the Micronesian Supreme Court. 
The struggle between law and society addressed in this article will 
undoubtedly continue in ways that are impossible to anticipate.  Certain 
constitutional provisions, especially in the Bill of Rights, and certain aspects 
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  See FSM CONST. art. IX, § 2(p) (amended 1991). 
74
 The changes are explained in King, supra note 36, at 271 n.70. 
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of the legal system—including its adversarial style, with winners and 
losers—are in tension with Micronesian norms.  Owing to this structural 
feature of their society-law relationship there is an ever-present potentiality 
for conflict. 
